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Missing the Fall 
Maurizio Godorecci 
-------------------
Review -essay of Donald P. Verene, The New Art of Autobiography: An 
Essay on the "Life of Giambattista Vico Written by Himself " (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1991) 
The Autobiography of Giambattista Vico has generally been regarded as 
a complement to the New Science rather than a valuable work in itself. 
The destiny of this work was to be used, employed as an auxiliary text 
by commentators of Vico's major philosophical writings, as D. P. 
Verene states in The New Art of Autobiography: An Essay on the "Life of 
Giambattista Vico Written by Himself" Coming from within this tradi-
tion, Verene essays instead to write a book which would do justice to 
Vico's "most undervalued work." (vii) Taking the lead from Croce's 
assertion that the Autobiography is the New Science in action, Verene 
pledges to fill in the space opened by Croce who did not pursue his 
very own instigation. In this pursuit of "justice," the Autobiography will 
stand in its own right as the first of its kind. It will have achieved the 
exemplary status that the Venetian sponsors wished for it and the 
whole genre will be forced to redress its modern foundations. The 
originality of the Autobiography rests on what Max Harold Fisch called 
the "genetic method." (The Autobiography of Giambattista Vico , trans. by 
M. H. Fisch and T. G. Bergin. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1944). Preceding Fisch's translation (last printing 1990), the original 
short preface states that "aside from the light it sheds on his other 
works, and the interest it has in common with every other intellectual 
autobiography, Vico' s has the unique interest of being the first applica-
tion of the genetic method by an original thinker to his own writings." 
(v) Verene is thus going to add a new chapter to Vico's work by 
extending himself beyond Croce while leaning on Fisch's insight. 
Indeed, Fisch does not lend any definition for "genetic method," 
forcing Verene to secure one first in a note and then repeatedly in the 
text. The definition in the note defying its marginality will overshad-
ow all the others that will follow. It reads: 
Fisch does not define "genetic method." I take the term in its broad 
sense to refer to the fact that Vico' s purpose is to understand his life as 
an intellectual development that moves from step to step and which has 
an overall coherence . As will be shown, in Vico' s case this coherent pat-
tern of development is tied to his conception of "ideal eternal history" 
and "providence." (note 4, p . 2) 
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When compared with Rousseau's Confessions, the originality of 
Vico' s Autobiography rests on an additional expansion of this definition 
which in Verene's words is now "a systematic narrative applying the 
genetic method to the causes of his own writings." (60) The quotation 
marks have disappeared, the writer having made what was Fisch' s 
instigation his own by turning it into a definition. Following this 
appropriation by an act of inference, "Vico's purpose" is to find a 
"coherent pattern" linked to his philosophy. And by proceeding "from 
step to step," Vico will understand the "overall coherence" of his life. 
A few pages ahead, juxtaposed with Girolamo Cardano (1501-1576) 
who wrote De vita propria liber, Vico is the one who "as the discoverer 
of the philosophical order of history, applies this historical manner of 
thought to himself." (70) By now the "genetic method" has turned into 
an application of the workings ("generative") of history operated by 
an outsider who, like an archaeologist, brings forth the causes of 
things step by step, that is, causes that "are internal to their natures" 
and that "emerge in the development of their natures." (71) Thus 
"nature" is not strictly "nascimento" -something that happens-but 
something that "develops" too. And the reason of the analysis weighs 
more on the causality principle than on divination of the event. 
Therefore the rhetoric of narration is focused on persuasion rather 
than on performance. 
Verene sets three aims for his procedure: to look for the princi-
ples of the New Science in the structure of Vico's Autobiography ; then, 
following their identification, such principles must be verified; and 
lastly, one must enter the "theatre of memory" (46-47) that links the 
inner to the outer world with particular consideration towards the 
"order" of the unfolding of events. The identification and the verifica-
tion of principles are here a scientific procedure that implies appropri-
ation and reproduction of a transferable entity. According to this, Vico 
is the "possessor of an original philosophical understanding of the ori-
gin of narrative itself." (47) Thus Vico is the "discoverer" of a new lit-
erary art, as new as his "science," since his autobiography is the first not 
only "to apply a genetic method" but the first to link its narrative to a 
philosophy "based on a new science of narration." (47) 
The Autobiography and the New Science are strictly interconnected 
regarding the first two points. After the application and the verifica-
tion of the New Science, what is left are the implications, Verene says. 
But these implications are still linked to the translation of the concept 
"new." The "new" of the New Science is translated into the unspoken 
yet powerful "new" of the (New) Autobiography. This operation is in 
want of identifying and possibly defining a new genre. A genre which 
as any genre is still evolutionistic at its heart-as here the terms "gen-
erative" and "method" both imply. Furthermore, such a distinction 
underlies, or better, restates an older one, namely that of separating 
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the sphere of philosophical writing from that of literary writing. How 
can one separate this "new science of narration" from the "nuova arte 
critica" of the new science? As the "nuova arte critica" invents the New 
Science, the new "new science of narration" is already at work. There 
can be no "New Science" outside narration. And indeed for Vico the rel-
evance of myth only testifies to this. Narration is at work from the 
beginning as a new "ars critica." The novelty of the science is strictly 
linked to that "ars." In fact, "new science" is already "new ars critica." 
The two cannot be thought of as a couple. On the contrary, the novelty 
of the new science rests upon praxis; the attention is shifted completely 
towards the performative whereas it used to lie on metaphysical 
premises. 
It is seductive to think of the New Science as of a new autobiogra-
phy of humanity (71) but the operation must carry a judgement and it 
must be reflexive in structure and ironic in narration, that is, self-nar-
rating. In this we recognize the character of "legere" -the jurispru-
dence which is at the core of the New Science. And law is actually three 
movements in one: lex as legere (to link), se ligando as reflexive link, and 
legenda as the recounting of the link, i.e., the linking. (Cf. E. Grassi, 
"L' origine des sciences de l' esprit dans l'Humanisme, Pensee 
Humaniste et tradition Chretienne aux XV et XVI siecles [Paris: 
Publication de la Societe d'Etudes ltaliennes, 1950]) Such an operation 
cannot take place without the unmasking of the "conceits" ("borie"). 
The destruction of the "borie" is the constant task of the New Science. 
(NS,# 1111) The autobiography of the human race can, as a myth (vera 
narratio), be narrated again truthfully only once its translation is 
accounted for. Therefore the allegorical dimension is reinstated to tes-
tify to the diversity of the voices (diversiloquium) that are true, that are 
etymological to language. 
The implications of which Verene speaks open the discussion 
towards a hermeneutic which does not challenge the architecture of 
the whole. On the contrary, he speaks of overall coherence, of discov-
ery of the origins of things upon which to recreate the whole. In this 
sense there can be knowledge. The "theatrical" is relevant only as a 
useful means toward awareness; it is not recognized to be the only 
aspect of human understanding. The "intention" of the author is fun-
damental to the definition of the felicitous or infelicitous outcome of 
any interaction-in this case a linguistic interaction. And the space is 
left open for the intention of the text which is expressed in the possible 
permutation of its "parts." Of course the role of the reader is rational-
ized as well in his intention to let the text speak the language of the 
author. 
Representation is at work in every human endeavor from the 
beginning. In this sense one cannot speak of a reality underlying the 
representation as a given. Representation is already reality-reality as 
284 DIFFERENT/A 
translation. The fable is at the heart of humanity. The tropes of the 
destruction of the "borie" are in themselves metaphors, to which the 
three basic institutions of God, marriage and burial testify. The geome-
try of mankind rests upon these three figures which are the "principi," 
origins and principles, of the metaphorical construction which begins 
with themselves being metaphors. They represent the poetic or credi-
ble impossibility of the "link." A link which is at work first of all with-
in each of them in their singularity. A link that stresses the reflexive 
while narrating itself. The "generative" aspect of Vico's method 
should take these workings into consideration. 
The question of the method still remains. Verene's statement 
does not differentiate the method he speaks of from the common 
understanding of the term, at least since the seventeenth century. With 
Descartes, and probably due to the elaboration of his followers, 
method becomes synonym for linearity and its virtue lies in its appli-
cations. On the other hand, metahodos ("after the way") not only sug-
gests the idea of "following" but also that of "beyond." It is possible to 
go after the way only if one goes beyond the way. In this sense what is 
being stressed is not so much the correctness but the seduction of the 
way which rather than compelling us to stay on it, seduces us to "pur-
sue" it, not to trust it but to take possession of it. Such a "way" wants 
to be "courted" and not obeyed. 
So we cannot go astray from what seduces us-from our illu-
sions. We are not look ing any longer for "persuasion," only for action . 
We want to be there when it happens. The "ratio" is now definitely 
lost and the "way" leads. 
The above aspect of method together with what we have said 
about "generative" lead to what is "critica." "Critique" and "sooth-
saying" parallel "critica" and "divination" in Vico. At the end of "Part 
B," in the Autobiography the concept of "nuova arte critica" is intro-
duced as a powerful force to judge the writers whose conceits must be 
destroyed. To "judge" is first of all to be understood in its juridical 
sense and then as "sifting" the true, as divination. Such discretion in 
reading escapes the English translation (cf. 167) as even the word 
"arte" is reduced to "method." But there is more . This new critical art 
"scuopre," unmasks, the way in which men first feigned themselves 
by feigning their own gods and the whole world . This novelty is tied 
to the narration seen as performative. The Autobiography performs 
according to such critique. 
"Divinare" (cf. NS, # 342) is "indovinare," what is hidden from 
men ("agli uomini") and what is hidden in men ("degli uomini"). The 
first reference is to the future, yet Vico uses the word "avvenire." 
"L' avvenire" is not simply the future, it is also what is going to come . 
"Avvenire" here is "inventio." It implies that invention is divine and is 
therefore "sacer ." The second hidden thing is "consciousness." This is 
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not simply what is hidden in men but what is hidden "of" men. What 
is hidden of men is knowledge (con-scire). With a double movement, 
the "of" in "degli" implies belonging as detachment. Thus "coscienza" 
is what exceeds men. What is different "of" men and "avvenire" is 
what is precluded to men. Yet men's exceeding will fill the remainder 
of invention as ad-venire turns into in-venire. To see the "link" (legere) 
that exceeds the event is to proleptically live it; i. e., divine what is hid-
den. So Vico, in divining his own "falls," gives us an account of his 
life. In order to do so he has to go beyond his very life. Thus Vico's use 
of the third person which contextually works in this direction, rather 
than serving as a simple historical continuation of some incipit of 
other autobiographies, such as Chiabrera' s ( cf. 66-67), or as opposi-
tional to the Cartesian "I," as Fisch remarks. Vico's critique to his own 
life is a "link." Vico is beyond his tomb, beyond his "written" life and 
speaks from there as if he were already dead. His Vita is a tomb, an 
open tomb and an open womb which generates itself. It is a reflexive 
operation for which the beginning is already a repetition. The "I" is 
already "he," the Life of G. B. Vico already the credible impossible life 
of the other: the other that is in ourselves and whose friendship we 
cherish beyond "dust." And with such friendship, thinking of 
Socrates, Vico goes beyond his Vita. The inequity of the sentence as 
expressed by Phaedrus includes the "fall" in the "judgement." Only 
after death is there hope. The Life of Vico is always being judged, and 
as any "lives," never equitably. Justice is a matter of the beyond. 
The autobiography, or self-biography, or periautography as Carlo 
Lodoli preferred to call it, does not necessarily stress the subject, as 
Verene clearly points out. They only stress the surroundings, the place, 
the topos, since such writing's only concern is reflexive. It is the con-
cern with itself lived as other. It stresses the irony of narration, its own 
irony. 
We are reminded that since the nineteenth century it is a com-
monplace to regard every philosophy as autobiographical. (ix-x) This 
is an idea taken up again in the discussion of Dilthey's perspective. 
(48-51) Nevertheless "idiomatic" should be preferred since the reflex-
ive aspect of the narration is part of any philosophy. And the idiomatic 
is linked to invention which, as for the law, is common but not com-
municable. Indeed one might say that the first autobiography was a 
hieroglyph-a first signature. Yet that signature had less to do with 
"being" than with "law." The autobiography is concerned with law 
because it is concerned with the "mark," with "character," with writ-
ing. The first concern of such writing is writing itself. Furthermore, it 
wouldn't be redundant to mention that the word autobiography is rel-
atively new. It apparently first appeared in English, and not much ear-
lier than the nineteenth century (cf. 53-54). Vico, as others before him, 
used the title stressing the word "life" and "writing" -Vita di 
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Giambattista Vico scritta da se medesimo. 
One's autobiography as well as the autobiography of humanity 
is concerned with the forces that allow for their structure. At the same 
time these forces can only be known proleptically, which is tanta-
mount to recognizing the underlying nihilistic aspect of life in general. 
Where life goes, its place can only be accounted for after, though it 
must be pre-given. In this sense, Vico' s new critical art deals with our 
belatedness. It is like reading backwards what goes forwards. And in 
all autobiography the singular events of life are turned into the general 
law of that same life. The way in which Vico deals with this is repre-
sented in the "fall." The result of each fall is singular and yet it is ele-
vated to a universal status-to be exemplary, to be law. The singularity 
is reinforced by connecting the fall with a particular malady. The fall 
and the sick body go hand in hand. What follows is a period of remis-
sion in which the sickness is the only concern for the healing person. 
These "falls" are signs. They represent the indelible marks of one's life. 
They are writing. A writing that can only be divined. And as pointed 
out, divination is the unmasking of what needs to be unmasked-the 
future as invention. Thus a rhetorical art is needed to perform the 
"credible impossibility" of the poetic world, that is, of the human 
world. And such a "making" is actually one with destruction. First of 
all it is the revelation of the singular as a general-a true unmasking 
which is equated to the destruction of the conceits, what we might call 
special interests. And at the same time, by such a reversal, what passes 
for general, universal, is actually bared to its singularity. The outcome 
of the operation is a "restoration" of the particular. The certain is 
restored as a wayfarer is restored-he is fed, he is taken care of. In this 
sense, Vico takes care of his falls. 
Falls and sickness are interlocked in what is a critical moment. 
The crisis must be dealt with. And the questioning of the mark has to 
deal with writing. The judgment must be passed on written texts. And 
indeed Vico's new critical art is defined as such. The events in life, cus-
toms, etc., can be the subject of the "new science" as well as of one's 
autobiography, but first and foremost they must be writing. Vico's 
unmasking is based on books because books represent the fall, the 
conceits of humanity as such. Humanity's shortcomings are in "writ-
ing." Writing is restored its unfulfilled character. Writing which wants 
to be the same once and forever does not exist. Its signature is denied 
by its very be-coming something else each time that it tries to be itself. 
Writing's only concern is with its own 'falls'. Such is Vico's account for 
the two autobiographies written by himself and written by humanity. 
Both narrations are allegorical ironies of the credible impossibility of 
being in the world. 
The Life of Giambattista Vico Written by Himself might be a "new sci-
ence of narration" but only if the novelty reflects a new attitude toward 
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writing. Narration as writing is a reflexive act and as such it is con-
cerned with law. Law is not "being." Jove's providence is Jove's pru-
dence-already a juris-prudence . Jurisprudence is the product of the 
human mind, it is its own providence. It is writing as forces without a 
field to determine their influence. These forces make and dissolve the 
field (context) of their own determination. This is the universal lan-
guage Vico speaks of-a mental language that partakes of both living 
and dead (languages). A language which cannot be reduced to the 
binary division between "langue" and "parole." There is no self-
awareness on the part of the subject; indeed there is no pregiven sub-
ject in such language. This language is the topos to allow everything 
else (institutions) to be; yet it is none of them since it is not the pregiv-
en place of being (or not being). It is different from any rhetorical argu-
ment or given topics such as God, marriage, and burial. In fact, such 
mental language is the language of "mind." It is a language and a 
mind that cannot be identified with the specific languages of men and 
it cannot be identified with the expression of any conceit. At the same 
time it is not a language that transcends all the other languages of the 
conceits. It is not a language according to our understanding of the 
word. In Vico's words, it is jurisprudence as one with mind. It is mind 
that allows for choice, Vico says. It is human choice at work. Yet it can-
not be assimilated to any such choices. It allows for judgement. But it 
is not judgement. This mind (language) of jurisprudence is "no-
where." It works as difference in what is and in what is not-it allows 
for choices to happen . All we have is "choice" ("fall"), that is, the sin-
gular, the idiomatic; indeed as do Vico' s life and philosophy begin 
with a fall and not simply with birth. Life begins with choices be it the 
fall from the ladder, in Vico' s case, or the thunder, in the history of 
mankind. And in this process of choosing, mind is at work. The mental 
language is at work first of all as a sign (hieroglyph, etc), as writing 
and choices (falls, errors) are made in response to the reading of such 
signs which, like forces, push us about. Only those who do not give up 
and rather put up a fight will succeed in "being" as a product of them-
selves. This is the case for the "giants" who are authors and owners of 
their own "eye" ("I")-i. e., customs, altars, fields, etc. 
Such mental language does not exist, since it has no place to be; 
and it is not Being since it precedes being-it must be before anything 
can be in it or not be in it. In this manner such a place is beyond the 
places of being(s). 
The fall as a choice is an im-position just as a "character" is for 
Vico. Character and name are the same. They are written and they are 
writing. Theim-position is over-, trans-, being as the "excess" of being; 
as what "remains" (unspoken). A character, a signature is over its own 
name, its own determination, imposition, framing, and is already 
other. This is the generative aspect of Vico's Life: a life which we are 
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still writing and which exceeds all that has been named already. Thus 
it is a life not yet written about a character not yet framed-a life of a 
name, Vico, who like Homer, though very relevant, never took place in 
the world. 
These are the workings of providence. Phronesis is "the faculty of 
the individual to assess where he stands in a particular situation" (133-
34). Phronesis, prudence for the ancients, is turned into sapientia by 
Vico (148). But it is a knowledge that started by dealing with what 
happened as if it never happened and with what had not happened as 
if it had already happened. This is basically Vico's definition of 
primeval jurisprudence. Indeed once we get well from a fall, all we are 
concerned with is that fall. In its extreme consequences, when we are 
faced with someone's death, with the death of a friend, all we can do 
is to mourn over it. Yet when the mourning is over all we are con-
cerned with can only be death. This is the passage from memory to 
memorialization (cf . Derrida, "Psyche: Inventions of the Other" 
[Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1989]). Our concern with 
the "fall" as "death," as memorialization is the work of providence-
of mind, Vico says, for which and by which everything is made. And 
the made is the true ; the true is made (by our concern with the 
unavoidable). Thus the unavoidability of what might always already 
have happened (as "fall," "death," etc.) but never took place in the 
world. The New Science as providence at work and as the result of 
providential intervention is "no-place" because it might always 
already have been (ignota latebat). But the point is not to uncover it, it 
is to invent it-to divine it from the marks with which we are left; to 
invent the credible impossibility of the works of human mind whose 
only concern is with the "fall." 
Our fall, the fall that hasn't taken place yet is all we are con-
cerned with. Our own demise has been announced in the death of the 
other which now is memorialized in ourselves. Such death is the only 
one we have ever experienced and whose recurrence is announced by 
our concern. In our avoiding that death we delay our own death . Yet 
there is a debt we must render, for which we must give reason. And 
that debt concerns our own death of which the memorialization of the 
other's death in ourselves is the place that nurtures it by delaying it. It 
is our protection, our self-preservation from our only fall. By memori-
alizing the death of the other in ourselves, we prepare for our own. In 
such a way our own death is already recurring before it ever took 
place. It cannot be avoided since we never experienced it; yet it is 
already taking place. And in our lives we live awaiting the moment in 
which it will occur, that moment in which it will return. That moment 
will mark our life by decreeing our death as the eternal return of the 
same. Meanwhile in reliving our death infinite times we relive our 
lives infinite times. Our lives, our names, are like each word, already 
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said yet spoken for the first time. We can try to avoid the falls that 
have already happened, but this won't protect us from those falls 
which have never taken place. In this sense our lives cannot have a 
"signature" since our lives cannot be comprehended even in the cycles 
of our lives. Indeed the cycle of each man's life is an infinite recurrence 
of itself in difference. In our expectation of the end(s) of life, we live 
through the end of life. 
The New Art of Autobiography touches upon many of these issues 
which Verene chooses to present within an historical (and at times, 
structural) frame of reference. The New Science and the Autobiography 
are no exception to the rule. The binary analysis finds its way to a dia-
grammatic representation of the fall (174); and this movement from 
birth to rebirth exemplifies the tendency of the whole book towards an 
open-ended conclusion. 
In Vico the narrative of history rather than the narrative of myth 
(83-84) recuperates the critical aspect of narration. However Vico must 
"invent himself as an historical being" (84) thus reaching a meeting 
ground between the two apparently opposed aspects of narration. 
Consequently, Vico's "life" shall become a fable. 
In order to pursue the instigation, Verene juxtaposes Vico with 
Descartes and with Augustine-less so with Rousseau and not at all 
with Nietzsche. These contrasting figures either by their presence or 
absence delimit the field of action of the present study which rests on 
the "Vichean perspective." (114). The author is well aware of the dan-
ger inherent in interpretation (126). In fact, by judging what is unfa-
miliar by what is familiar (NS, #122), one can turn interpretation into 
those same conceits that Vico intends to destroy. The way Verene 
chooses is a third one, namely "to enter into Vico's thought to discover 
the lever and fulcrum Vico uses to lift the world." (126). The legitima-
cy of this third way lies in Vico's invitation to the reader to meditate 
his own New Science. What is not stated by the justification is that Vico 
tells the reader that because of this, he will feel God-like and will expe-
rience a divine pleasure. Nothing is said about translating such medi-
tations into applications. This is so because any application is an act of 
translation which presupposes communication, homogeneity and con-
tinuity with regard to both the fields of analysis and the method. In 
this dimension, understanding is actually the only reason for all inter-
pretations. The attention of the reader is so focused on his goal that he 
will tend to overlook the singular movements operated in the text at 
hand. To enter into Vico's thought is tantamount to putting oneself in 
Vico's place, playing Vico's part and corning out with the correct read-
ing of the part according to the author's mind who preserved his 
intention in his works. This is not simple common sense. It is the 
adherence to a conceit that resists to be seen as such. And the most 
authoritative formulation is in Leibniz's assertion that nihil est sine 
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ratione -except nihil, of course. This implies that a new art of criticism 
which identifies the crises of human history must be a radical criticism 
of the foundation of this same history. And indeed Vico' s criticism 
starts with the power of the nihil: the "thunder" and the "fall." To 
enter Vico's thought is first of all to think again this very thought-the 
only one indeed since jovis omnia plena. The conceits arose as soon as 
men forgot this. 
The connection between fabula and historia seems to be using nar-
rative rather than being narrative. For Verene the new critical art is 
"meditation that brings the philological certains of history together 
with the philosophical history of ideas" (157). This allows for the read-
ing of Vico's Life as a fable in as much as it recognizes the relevance of 
the myth. And the proof for this is to be found in Vico' s willing mis-
takes throughout his narration. Verene recuperates these "mis-" by 
reading in them a perfectly hidden architecture made up of all the pos-
sible permutations of a given data (cf., Ch. 5), and so follows the 
lengthy explanation of the hidden meanings of the number 70 and its 
readings starting from the speculation on Vico' s misgiven birthdate 
(177-85). To enter into Vico's thought has turned into finding Vico's 
recondite wisdom whose power, once released, leaves us with a cab-
balistic universe. 
The radical question about the relevance of the fable at the begin-
ning of it all is not posed; it is simply traced back to other ideas of 
fables. In this sense the Autobiography of Vico, at best, turns into an 
exercise of a method avoiding the major issues of authority, text and 
history as part of fable. Vico says that there is no book before his New 
Science (NS, # 330) and Verene suggests that as odd as this may seem it 
is linked to a reference to Descartes (211) and it is justified by the fact 
that no book is endowed with such an original method of narrative. 
The attention still falls on the arrangement of the book, on the texture 
as a structural entity rather than on its grammatological implications. 
Vico's repetitions are not all part of an infinitely limited universe. They 
are the impossible reiteration of the "fall" in ever-differing contexts. 
Metaphysics is concerned with its own modifications and Vico's New 
Science is concerned with its own language. The Autobiography is no 
exception. And the writing of the Autobiography is our writing's con-
cern. Verene misses the opportunity to complete his otherwise keen 
reading by purposely avoiding such a path. Indeed Verene asserts that 
to focus on writing as the only subject of an autobiography is equiva-
lent to not having a "life" at all (cf. reference to Augustine, 99). By con-
cluding with Joyce, Verene, who strikes out in the right direction, still 
avoids bringing his insights to their extreme consequences. His the-
matic concern identifies the direct presence of Vico in Finnegans Wake 
(227-31) and leads to the statement that "No more complicated a com-
mentary is likely to be written on Vico, who in Joyce's hands becomes 
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himself the symbol for the complete speech of the human world." 
(228) This comment is very close to asserting that Vico's presence in 
Joyce's work is only in language. Vico's immortality is not at stake; 
there is only writing. No comparison is possible: only the singularity 
of writing faces those must write about it. 
In preparing for a death that never took place, we live a life we 
have never lived, and we speak in a language we have never spoken 
as we read in a language we have forgotten. 
